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SEcunrrms R:acoLATION-CIVIL LIA.nn.ITY UNDER RtILE X-I0B-5
FOR FRAUD IN nm PtmcHAsE OR SALE OF SBctJRITIEs-On May 21,

1942 the Securities and Exchange Commission, pursuant to section
IO(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,1 promulgated rule
X-IOB-5. 2 The purpose of the new rule was apparently to close a
loophole in the then existing pattern of regulation of the purchase
M Rogers, ''Modem Warfare and Its Effect on Policy Ccmstruction," 1952 INS.
55 N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 9, 1953, §3, p. I.
56 Pollmann, "Commercial Accident Insurance," 1952 INS. L.J. 737 at 744.

li7Ibid.

L.J. 360.
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and sale of securities.3 The loophole resulted from a gap between
section l 7(a) of the Securities Act of 1933,4 which prohibits the use
of fraud in the sale of securities by any person, and section 15(c)(l)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,5 which prohibits the use of
fraud in the sale or purchase of securities by brokers and dealers.6
The two sections, while overlapping in part, do not cover the purchase
of securities by "any person." Rule X-IOB-5 merely repeats the
language of section l 7(a), but extends the prohibition to the purchase
as well as the sale of securities.
The broad language of X-IOB-5, coupled with the development
by the courts of the concept of implied liability under the various
sections of both the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, offered to defrauded sellers of securities a bright and
promising hook upon which to hang their claims for legal relief. It is
the purpose here to discuss briefly the present condition of this somewhat nebulous legal peg.

I. Implied Liability Under the Securities Acts
The Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 contain several sections which expressly give a civil cause of
action against a violator of the particular section creating the cause of
action.7 The liabilities so created are restricted by special statutes
s See SEC Release No. 3230, May 21, 1942, in which X-l0B-5 is described as closing
"a loophole in the protections against fraud . . • by prohibiting individuals or companies
from buying securities if they engage in fraud in their purchase."
4 48 Stat. L. 84, §l7(a) (1933), 15 U.S.C. (1946) §77q(a).
5 48 Stat. L. 895, §15(c) (1934), as amended by 52 Stat. L. 1075, §2 (1938), 15
U.S.C. (1946) §78o(c).
6 The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 defines brokers and dealers as follows: "The
term 'broker' means any person engaged in the business of effecting transactions in securities for the account of others, but does not include a bank." 48 Stat. L. 882, §3(a)(4)
(1934), 15 U.S.C. (1946) §78c(a)(4). "The term 'dealer' means any person engaged in
the business of buying and selling securities for his own account, through a broker or
otherwise, but does not include a bank, or any person insofar as he buys or sells securities
for his own account, either individually or in some fiduciary capacity, but not as a part of
a regular business." 48 Stat. L. 882, §3(a)(5) (1934), 15 U.S.C. (1946) §78c(a)(5).
7 Securities Act of 1933: Sec. 11 provides for liability for making untrue statements in
a registration statement, §12(1) provides for liability for violation of §5, which has to do
with transactions on unregistered exchanges, and §12(2) provides for liability for the sale
of securities by means of untrue or misleading statements in a prospectus. 48 Stat. L. 82,
§11 (1933), 15 U.S.C. (1946) §77k; 48 Stat. L. 84, §12 (1933), 15 U.S.C. (1946) §771.
Securities Exchange Act of 1934: Sec. 9(e) provides for liability for manipulation of
securities on a registered exchange, §16(b) gives a cause of action to corporations to recapture profits made by an insider through speculation in the corporation's securities, and §18
provides for liability for misleading statements in a registration statement. 48 Stat. L. 889,
§9(e) (1934), 15 U.S.C. (1946) §78i(e); 48 Stat. L. 896, §l6(b) (1934), 15 U.S.C.
(1946) 0:77p(b); 48 Stat. L. 897, §18 (1934) as amended by 49 Stat. L. 1379, §5 (1936),
15 U.S.C. (1946) §78r.
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of limitation.8 In addition, the act of 1934 contains a section rendering
void any contract made in violation of any of the sections of the act. 9
Those sections which do not expressly create a cause of action merely
make unlawful the conduct prohibited by the section or by the rules
and regulations prescribed by the Securities and Exchange Commission pursuant to the section.
In spite of this absence of express civil liability for violation of
most of the sections in each act, the courts have developed an implied
civil liability. The first move in this direction was made in the case
of Geismar 11. Bond & Goodwin, Inc. 10 The court held that section
29(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended in 1938,11
"clearly contemplates that a civil suit" may be brought for a violation
of section 15(c)(l) of the act.12 A different basis of liability was
applied in Baird 11. Franklin. 18 In this case, involving an action under
section 6(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,14 the court made
use of the common law doctrine of recognizing a private action based
on a violation of a statute designed to protect a certain class of persons.111
Since the act was for the protection of investors, the court reasoned
that to construe section 6(b) as not creating a civil liability would be
to render the purpose of the act a "snare and a delusion." These two
theories were merged in Goldstein 11. Groesbeck,1 6 an action under
the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935,1 7 which contains
a section almost identical with section 29(b) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934.18
s The limitation is usually one year from the date of discovery of the violation, but not
more than three years from the date of the violation.
9 Sec. 29(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 48 Stat. L. 903, §29(b) (1934),
as amended by 52 Stat. L. 1076, §3 (1938), 15 U.S.C. (1946) §78cc.
10 (D.C. N.Y. 1941) 40 F. Supp. 876 at 878.
1148 Stat. L. 903, §29(b) (1934), as amended by 52 Stat. L. 1076, §3 (1938), 15
U.S.C. (1946) §78cc. The amendment added a proviso to §29(b) to the effect that the
section would not apply to render contracts made in violation of the act void in an action
brought in reliance on §29(b) for a violation of §15 unless the action is brought within
one year after discovery of the violation, and within three years of the date of the violation.
The amendment is significant in that §15 does not expressly create a civil cause of action.
12 Geismar v. Bond & Goodwin, Inc., (D.C. N.Y. 1941) 40 F. Supp. 876 at 878.
1s (2d Cir. 1944) 141 F. (2d) 238, cert. den. 323 U.S. 737, 65 S.Ct. 36 (1944).
14 48 Stat. L. 885, §6(b) (1934), 15 U.S.C. (1946) §78f(h).
15 This theory was expounded by Judge Clark in what is termed a dissenting opinion,
but which actually is a discussion of whether §6(h) could be the basis for the cause of
action, a question whicb the majority assumed without discussion. Judge Clark disagreed
with the court only on the question of whether the plaintiffs had shown damages.
16 (2d Cir. 1944) 142 F. (2d) 422, cert. den. 323 U.S. 737, 65 S.Ct. 36 (1944).
17 49 Stat. L. 803 (1935), 15 U.S.C. (1946) §79 et seq.
18 The court applied both the common law theory of private action based on a statute
and the rationale of Geismar v. Bond & Goodwin, (D.C. N.Y. 1941) 40 F. Supp. 876. .
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In Kardon v. National Gypsum Co.,1 9 the first attempt to base
a private cause of action on a violation of X-IOB-5 was successful.
The action arose out of a purchase of stock by two directors of the
issuing corporation from two other directors of the same corporation.
Prior to the purchase, the defendants had negotiated for a sale of all
the corporation's assets without the knowledge of the plaintiffs. Subsequent to the transfer of the stock, the defendants consummated the
sale of the assets and realized a handsome profit. On motions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and failure to state a cause of action, th~
court held that there was an implied liability for violation of X-1 OB-5
on the common law theory of a private action based on a statute. As
an afterthought, the court also approved the rationale of Judge Coxe
in the Geismar case, that section 29(b) of the act implies that Congress intended to create a civil liability for violation of the various
sections of the act.
Since the Kardon case, the various district and circuit courts have
been in substantial agreement on the proposition that section I O(b)
and X-IOB-5 create an implied civil liability.20 However, it is still
unclear what the scope of the liability is, and there remains much
room for speculation when attempting to sketch its outer boundaries.

IL General Scope of the Liability Under X-I0B-5
A. The Securities Covered. Section IO(b) and X-IOB-5 both
refer to "any security registered on a national securities exchange or
any security not so registered."21 The question has been raised in
19 (D.C. Pa. 1946) 69 F. Supp. 512 (motion to dismiss); (D.C. Pa. 1947) 73 F.
Supp. 798 (on the merits); (D.C. Pa. 1947) 83 F. Supp. 613 (request for additional find·
ings of fact and law).
20 Acker v. Schulte, (D.C. N.Y. 1947) 74 F. Supp. 683; Montague v. Electronic Corp.
of America, (D.C. N.Y. 1948) 76 F. Supp. 933; Seward v. Hammond, (D.C. Mass. 1948)
8 F.R.D. 457; Slavin v. Germantown Fire Ins. Co., (3d Cir. 1949) 174 F. (2d) 799;
Hawkins v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Beane, (D.C. Ark. 1949) 85 F. Supp. 104;
Robinson v. Difford, (D.C. Pa. 1950) 92 F. Supp. 145; Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co.,
(2d Cir. 1951) 188 F. (2d) 783; Rosenberg v. Globe Aircraft Corp., (D.C. Pa. 1948) 80
F. Supp. 123; Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., (2d Cir. 1952) 193 F. (2d) 461; Joseph
v. Farnsworth Radio & Television Corp., (D.C. N.Y. 1951) 99 F. Supp. 701; Fry v.
Schumaker, (D.C. Pa. 1947) 83 F. Supp. 476; Stella v. Kaiser, (D.C. N.Y. 1948) 82 F.
Supp. 301; Osborne v. Mallory, (D.C. N.Y. 1949) 86 F. Supp. 869; Speed v. Transamerica, (D.C. Del. 1951) 99 F. Supp. 808; Northern Trust Co. v. Essaness Theatres
Corp., (D.C. ill. 1952) 103 F. Supp. 954; Pratt v. Robinson, (9th Cir. 1953) 203 F. (2d)
627; 59 YALE L.J. 1120 (1950); 61 HARv. L. REv. 858 (1948). For a complete treatment
of all the problems surrounding X-IOB-5, see Loss, SEcumT.IEs REcULAnoN, c. XIII
(1951).
21 See notes 1 and 2 supra. The term "security'' is defined in both acts very broadly,
and includes "any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture, certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement or in any oil, gas, or other mineral royalty or lease,
any collateral-trust certificate, preorganization certificate or subscription, transferable share,
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several cases whether X-1 0B-5 covers transactions in all securities, or
only transactions in securities either listed on a national stock exchange
or dealt in by dealers and brokers. The basis for the argument that
only listed securities or securities dealt in on "over-the-counter" markets
are covered is that the preamble to the act of 1934 seems to indicate
that only securities on national exchanges and on over-the-counter
markets are to come within the purview of the act.22 The cases agree,
however, that X-IOB-5 covers transactions in all securities, including
transactions between two individual investors, regardless of whether
the securities are listed or dealt in on an over-the-counter market. This
conclusion is reached by some of the courts by defining "over-thecounter market" to mean transaction in any security not listed on a
national stock exchange, and therefore even the preamble to the act
covers all securities.23 The other rationale is that while "over-thecounter market" means transaction through a broker or dealer, the
language of section IO(b) and X-IOB-5 is so unambiguous that the
preamble to the act cannot be referred to in determining their meaning,
and the words "or any security not so registered" clearly covers all
securities.24
B. Use of Instrumentalities of Interstate Commerce. It has been
held that X-1 0B-5 covers transactions in securities even though no
element of fraud takes place in the use of the instrumentality of
interstate commerce. It is necessary only that such an instrumentality
be used "in connection with" a transaction effected by fraudulent
means.25 Thus, if a meeting between the parties to the transaction is
arranged by means of the telephone or the mails, and the fraud takes
place at the meeting, the transaction will come under the operation ,
of X-IOB-5. Furthermore, it is not necessary that the transaction itself
inveslment contract, voting-trust certificate, certificate of deposit, for a security, or in general,
any instrument commonly known as a 'security'; or any certificate of interest or participation
in, temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for, or warrant or right to subscribe to or
purchase, any of the foregoing.•••" Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 48 Stat. L. 882,
§3(a)(I0) (1934), 15 U.S.C. (1946) §78c(a)(I0).
22 The preamble reads in part: ''For the reasons hereinafter enumerated, transactions
in securities as commonly conducted upon se~urities exchanges and over-the-counter markets
are affected with a national public interest which makes it necessary to provide for regulation and control of such transactions.•••" 48 Stat. L. 881, §2 (1934), 15 U.S.C. (1946)
§78(b).
23 Robinson v. Difford, (D.C. Pa. 1950) 92 F. Supp. 145 at 147; Northern Trust Co.
v. Essaness Theatres Corp., (D.C. Ill. 1952) 103 F. Supp. 954 at 961.
24 Speed v. Transamerica Corp., (D.C. Del. 1951) 99 P. Supp. 808; Pratt v. Robinson,
(9th Cir. 1953) 203 P. (2d) 627.
25 Northern Trust Co. v. Essaness Theatres Corp., (D.C. Ill. 1952) 103 P. Supp. 954
at 964; Pratt v. Robinson, (9th Cir. 1953) 203 P. (2d) 627 at 634.
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be one which transverses state boundaries. As long as an instrumentality of interstate commerce, such as the telephone or the mails, is
used in some connection with the transaction, the Securities Acts
apply. And this is true even though the transaction involves securities
of a local nature. 26

C. Persons Liable. For the most part, X-IOB-5 has been used
in situations involving the purchase of securities by "insiders." Early
enforcement by the Commission set this pattern, and. apparently has
influenced the development of the civil liability.27 The most striking
example of the use of X-IOB-5 as the basis for an action against
corporate insiders is the Transamerica case.28 In that case, which
involved the purchase of securities of a subsidiary corporation by the
parent without disclosure of an increase in the actual value of the
subsidiary's assets, the court allowed recovery for fraud in favor of
plaintiffs who had sold their shares in response to offers to buy mailed
out by the defendant corporation, and in favor of plaintiffs who had
turned in their stock for redemption or held it in spite of the declared
redemption.29 The result in the Transamerica case is not too surprising, since the situation involved a large number of investors and
presented an instance in which regulation of the transaction was in
the public interest.
In Robinson v. Difford30 and Northern Trust Co. v. Essaness
Theatres Corp., 31 however, the corporations involved were relatively
closed corporations, and the parties interested were few in number.
In each case, an action was allowed against a corporation for fraud
under X-IOB-5 in the purchase of its own stock. In neither case was
there a strong element of public interest, but on the contrary both
cases arose out of dealings between stockholders in privately held
corporations.
A more recent case, Pratt v. Robinson,32 arose out of the same dispute that gave rise to the Difford case. The plaintiff was one of the
26

Northern Trust Co. v. Essaness Theatres Corp., (D.C. lli. 1952) 103 F. Supp. 954

at 964.
27 59 HARv. L. RBv. 769 (1946); 44 ILL. L. RBv. 841 (1950).
28 Speed v. Transamerica Corp., (D.C. Del. 1951) 99 F. Supp. 808.
29 The litigation was long and involved. See Geller v. Transamerica Corp.,

(D.C. Del.
1943) 53 F. Supp. 625, affd. per curiam (3d Cir. 1945) 151 F. (2d) 534; Zahn v. Transamerica Corp., (3d Cir. 1947) 162 F. (2d) 36, noted 46 MicH. L. RBv. 1061 (1948)
and 61 HARV. L. RBv. 359 (1948); Friedman v. Transamerica Corp., (D.C. Del. 1945)
63 F. Supp. 247. The Zahn and Friedman cases were decided on the merits with Speed
v. Transamerica Corp., (D.C. Del. 1951) 99 F. Supp. 808.
30 (D.C. Pa. 1950) 92 F. Supp. 145.
31 (D.C. lli. 1952) 103 F. Supp. 954.
32 (9th Cir. 1953) 203 F. (2d) 627.
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defrauded stockholders who had not joined in the Difford litigation.
The district court, in an unreported oral opinion,33 dismissed the action
on the ground that the scope of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
did not cover the transaction, a holding contra to the Difford case.
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that
the transaction did fall within the scope of the act and X-IOB-5. While
this case involved corporate insiders, the private nature of the transaction would seem to indicate a tendency of the courts to extend the
operation of X-1 0B-5 beyond the normal operation of the Securities
Acts.84

III. A Speculative Conclusion
There are many more problems raised by X-IOB-5 than those
discussed here. Such questions as the necessity for privity between
the seller and the purchaser,3 5 the elements of the fraud that must be
alleged,36 the nature of the duty of disclosure imposed,37 and other
related questions have been the subject of much comment.38 Underlying all of these questions is the much more important problem of
how far X-l0B-5 should be allowed to encroach upon local regulation
of private security transactions. The cumulative effect of the courts'
holding that X-l0B-5 covers all securities, with apparently no limitation except the definition of "security" in the acts, and that even intrastate transactions may give rise to liability, is that almost any transaction
involving a sale of securities will fall under the strictures of X-IOB-5
and the regulation of the Securities and Exchange Commission. Even
more important to the investor is the threat of civil liability completely
independent of local statutory or common law liability for fraud. It
seems quite possible that the next logical step will be an attempt to
use X-IOB-5 to fix liability on a private investor for any act which
contravenes any provision of X-l0B-5 in either the sale or the purchase
of securities in a private transaction.
J. David Voss, S.Ed.
3 3 Pratt v. Robinson, D.C. Wash., July 31, 1951, No. 2765. The general content of
the oral opinion is discussed in Northern Trust Co. v. Essaness Theatres Corp., (D.C. ID.
1952) 103 F. (2d) 954 at 965.
3 4 Almost all of the sections of both acts are aimed at regulation of securities registered
on a national exchange or of brokers and dealers in securities.
35 See Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., (2d Cir. 1952) 193 F. (2d) 461, noted
100 Umv. PA. L. REv. 1251 (1952); Joseph v. Farnsworth Radio & Television Corp.,
(D.C. N.Y. 1951) 99 F. Supp. 701, noted 4 STAN. L. REv. 308 (1952).
36 See Seward v. Hammond, (D.C. Mass. 1948) 8 F.R.D. 457; Speed v. Transamerica
Corp., (D.C. Del. 1951) 99 F. Supp. 808.
s1 See 59 YAU! L.J. 1120 (1950).
38 36 CALIF. L. REv. 325 (1948); 44 ILI.. L. REv. 841 (1950); 14 Umv. Cm. L.
REv. 471 (1947); 59 HAnv. L. REv. 769 (1946).

